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PREFACE 
This is the 29th of a series of Working Papers prepared for the Pro-Poor Livestock 
Policy Initiative (PPLPI). The purpose of these papers is to explore issues related to 
livestock development in the context of poverty alleviation. 
Livestock is vital to the economies of many developing countries. For low income 
producers, livestock can serve as a vital source of food, store of wealth, provide 
draught power and organic fertiliser for crop production and a means of transport. 
Consumption of livestock and livestock products in developing countries, though 
starting from a low base, is growing rapidly. 
This paper explores the policy environment surrounding livestock policy improvements 
in Uganda, with a view to identify opportunities for pro-poor interventions and 
reforms.  The paper reviews challenges facing livestock producers and analyzes the 
broad political economic context in which livestock sector dynamics are situated. 
We hope this paper will provide useful information to its readers and any feedback is 
welcome by the authors, PPLPI and the Livestock Information, Sector Analysis and 
Policy Branch (AGAL) of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 
Disclaimer 
The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not 
imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any 
country, territory, city or area or its authorities or concerning the delimitations of its 
frontiers or boundaries. The opinions expressed are solely those of the author(s) and 
do not constitute in any way the official position of the FAO. 
Author 
Robin L. Turner under the direction of David K. Leonard. 
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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This paper explores the policy environment surrounding livestock policy improvements 
in Uganda, a country that has undergone substantial reforms in the last 15 years.  It 
aims to identify opportunities for pro-poor interventions—reforms that would improve 
the livelihoods of poor rural livestock producers.  Towards this end, the paper reviews 
challenges facing for livestock producers and analyzes the broad political economic 
context in which livestock sector dynamics are situated.  The adoption and 
implementation of pro-poor livestock sector interventions are in some ways 
constrained and, in others, enabled by civil conflict in several parts of the country, 
the semi-authoritarian nature of the Museveni regime, and the reform alliance 
between the Ugandan national government and its international development 
partners.  Ugandans face an uneasy trade-off between political stability and 
democracy that inhibits participation.   
A review of the livestock sector highlights the constraints facing poor rural livestock 
producers.  Livestock production contributes to rural livelihoods by serving as a source 
of food, a store of wealth, and a source of cash.  Missing or inadequate 
infrastructure—such as roads, electricity, weighing stations and cattle dips— serves as 
a serious constraint to the marketing of livestock.  Inadequate infrastructure raises 
transaction costs, exacerbates information asymmetries between producers and 
traders, and discourages investment in processing. Although the government has 
begun rebuilding the infrastructure destroyed during the civil conflicts, much of the 
responsibility for animal health services provision and marketing infrastructure has 
been devolved to local governments that have not prioritized the livestock sector. 
Policymakers and livestock producers are also challenged by the small size of the 
domestic market and limited capacity to service international markets.   
Livestock producers are situated in a complex political environment.  Many residents 
of northern and eastern Uganda continue to suffer from violent conflict between the 
Lord's Resistance Army, the government, and civilians or from predation by cattle 
rustlers.  These conflicts have devastating humanitarian costs, they divert resources 
toward security and away from investment in livestock and other areas, and they 
reinforce the influence of the security apparatus relative to elected officials and civil 
servants.  
In stable regions, Ugandans encounter the semi-authoritarian political regime 
established by Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM).  This regime 
combines elections and other opportunities for citizens to influence public policy with 
restrictions on political participation and occasional violations of citizens’ civil 
liberties, sending mixed signals to citizens. The “Movement” political system allowed 
individuals to contest elections but prohibited political parties from engaging in core 
activities such as preparing platforms, holding regular meetings, and opening branch 
offices.  The Ugandan government also has implemented decentralization measures 
ostensibly intended to bring government closer to the people.  Local governments 
enjoy substantial authority, and many village councils enjoy popular support.  
However, much of the decision-making authority is concentrated at the more difficult-
to-access district level where officials often operate in a corrupt or clientelistic 
manner.  In this environment, most citizens will not fully exploit existing opportunities 
to participate.   
Since 1986, the NRM government has implemented major liberalizing economic 
reforms that seek to alter the state’s basic approach to the market and service 
provision. These reforms have been pushed by an alliance of major multilateral and 
bilateral donors and reformers within government who worked together on an ongoing 
Exexutive Summary 
v 
basis.  Although neoliberal reform rhetoric pervades policy discourse, many civil 
servants are sceptical about this approach.  Although donors have sought to work 
around resistance by creating new, reform-supportive agencies, the cases of the 
National Agricultural Advisory Services and the African Development Bank Livestock 
Sector Development Program loan show that it is difficult for reforms to succeed 
without allies within more established agencies.   
The donor-government reform alliance also has focused attention on poverty, and the 
government has institutionalized processes through which associations, organizations 
and local governments can participate in policy formulation.  The Poverty Eradication 
Action Plan (PEAP) is the Uganda’s central policy document on poverty and 
development, and it is now revised through a participatory process.  During the most 
recent revision, pastoralism-supportive organizations engaged in a concerted effort to 
alter the way in which the PEAP addresses pastoralism and pastoralist issues with 
some success.  While the Poverty Eradication Action Plan revision process highlights 
the potential for propoor reforms within a liberal paradigm, the privatization of the 
parastatal Dairy Corporation highlights the limits of reform.  Although the 
privatization of the Dairy Corporation directly affected thousands of livestock 
producers, producers and potential buyers were largely excluded from the decision-
making process until a series of newspaper articles revealed irregular actions by 
members of the Cabinet and the President.  Eventually, it was announced that the 
corporation would be sold to dairy farmers.  In this case, the media played a crucial 
role in opening up processes for review.   
The concluding section outlines several interventions that could improve the 
livelihoods of poor rural livestock producers in Uganda. Working within the dominant 
neoliberal reform context, the proposed interventions seek to reduce barriers to 
producer benefit and improve the functioning of livestock markets.  In particular, 
information provision, investment in infrastructure, and development of measurable 
indicators of how reforms affect poor Ugandans could have substantial impact. 
Proposed interventions include: 
! Facilitating provision and maintenance of livestock-specific infrastructure 
! Disseminating livestock market information to livestock producers 
! Eliminating or reducing fees on the sale or slaughter of livestock 
! Establishing standards or branding mechanisms to identify high quality livestock 
products 
! Incorporating indicators of poor people and pastoralists’ participation and benefit 
into the assessment of government supported programs; and 
! Building the capacity of membership associations to participate in policy processes. 
The proposed interventions would increase livestock producers’ capacity to engage 
with the market and with the state.  The interventions discussed above would not 
alter the fundamental political context of semi-authoritarian governance and enduring 
violent conflict in much of the country.  Ugandans will decide how to address these 
problems through their individual and collective actions over the long-term. 
 
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper explores the policy environment surrounding livestock policy improvements 
in Uganda, a country that has undergone substantial reforms in the last 15 years.  Its 
aim is to identify opportunities for pro-poor interventions—reforms that would 
improve the livelihoods of poor rural livestock producers.  To do so, one must situate 
livestock sector dynamics in the broader political economic environment.  The 
adoption and implementation of pro-poor livestock sector interventions are in some 
ways constrained and, in others, enabled by the semi-authoritarian nature of the 
Museveni regime, the unresolved conflict in northern and eastern Uganda, and the 
reform alliance between the Ugandan national government and its international 
development partners.  There is space for pro-poor interventions in this context – in 
particular, information provision, investment in infrastructure, and development of 
measurable indicators for poverty impact could have substantial positive impact —but 
poor producers will remain vulnerable as long as Ugandans face an uneasy trade-off 
between stability and democracy.  While these structural problems cannot be easily 
resolved, particularly by outsiders, livestock sector interventions should take these 
factors into account. 
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 1 provides an overview of the livestock 
sector, highlighting the production and marketing processes.  This section also 
identifies several challenges which livestock sector participants face.  Section 2 
describes and analyzes Uganda's political environments, discussing the political 
regime, the civil conflicts, and local governance.  This section highlights the 
contradictions between the real opportunities for participation and accountability, 
continued reliance on patronage, and the semi-authoritarian nature of the political 
regime.  Section 3 discusses the dynamics of Uganda’s economic and participatory 
reforms.  Reform processes have been shaped by an alliance between reformers within 
government and Uganda’s major development partners.  While alliance partners have 
made neo-liberal governance the dominant discourse and policy approach, civil 
servants with different perspectives have used a variety of tactics to work around the 
framework as illustrated by the case of the African Development Bank Livestock 
Productivity Improvement Project.  The Poverty Eradication Action Plan shows how 
reforms have prioritized poverty and increased openness to civil society while the 
privatization of the Dairy Corporation highlights the limitations of participatory 
reforms.  The final section identifies several options for strategic pro-poor 
interventions in the livestock sector. 
This paper is based on research conducted in Uganda in October and November of 
2004.  Interviews were conducted with leaders of farmers associations and other 
livestock sector membership groups, officials from government ministries and 
parastatal organizations, staff of Ugandan and international civil society 
organizations, individuals from multilateral and bilateral donor agencies, and 
researchers.1  The paper also draws from scholarly publications, reports produced by 
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), and the Ugandan English-language media. 
 
                                                 
1 All quotations are taken from the author’s interviews unless an alternate citation is provided.  Short quotations are marked 
by quotation marks “”;  longer quotations are indented. To protect respondents’ confidentiality, most quotations do not 
identify individuals by name or organization.  Identification is provided for public statements and quotations in which the 
individual agreed to be identified. 
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SECTION I: LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION, PROCESSING, AND MARKETING 
IN UGANDA 
Uganda is a largely rural and agricultural society.  About 88 percent of the population 
lives in rural areas (UBOS 2002), and agriculture comprises roughly 45 percent of the 
gross domestic product (GDP).  Additionally, the agricultural sector employs about 80 
percent of the labour force (UBOS 2001).  Although crop-based agriculture is dominant 
– exports of coffee, cotton, tobacco and tea are the primary sources of export 
earnings – livestock production is an important contributor to subsistence livelihoods.  
It is estimated that livestock production comprises 7.5 percent of GDP and 17 percent 
of Agricultural GDP (Muhereza and Ossiya 2003).2  Although agriculture provides 
subsistence and income for many Ugandans, many agriculturalists remain poor.  
Ugandans reliant upon crop agriculture are more likely to be poor than those reliant 
on other agricultural activities such as livestock and fishing.  Slightly more than half of 
Ugandans reliant on crops were poor as compared to about a third of those engaged in 
noncrop agriculture (Okidi et al. 2004: Table A4).   
Livestock production is most important in the “cattle corridor” which ranges from 
Ntungamao district in southwestern Uganda to Kotido district in the northeast (See 
map on following page).  About 60 percent of households in the cattle corridor keep 
livestock, and the majority of indigenous cattle are kept in the corridor (NAADS ; King 
2002c).  Nationally, about 40 percent of rural households own poultry, 20 percent own 
cattle, and close to one third have goats (UBOS 2001).  For most households, livestock 
are not an important source of cash incomes (Ashley and Nanyeenya 2002).  Instead, 
livestock are important because they serve as a source of food, as a store of wealth (a 
bank), and, in the case of cattle, as a status symbol.  Livestock accumulation can 
enable households to diversify and improve their livelihoods.  Cattle also are used to 
pay bride price in many communities.  These uses of livestock are not recorded in the 
GDP figures provided above. 
Livestock Production 
Livestock production in Uganda is overwhelmingly a small holder and pastoralist 
undertaking.  Smallholders and pastoralists jointly possess 90 percent of cattle and a 
larger proportion of poultry, pigs, sheep and goats (FAO 2004).  Most livestock are 
raised in one of three broad production systems: mixed crop and livestock production, 
pastoral production and commercial ranching.  Of these, the mixed systems account 
for the majority of livestock.  In pastoral production systems, livestock production is 
the central component of a livelihood strategy in which producers move with their 
livestock in search of water and grazing (See Muhereza 2003; Muhereza and Ossiya 
2003).  In Uganda, most pastoralist households have a land base; they are not purely 
nomadic.   Although pastoralism is most common in arid areas of northeastern Uganda, 
seasonal movements of cattle occur throughout the corridor.   A small proportion of 
livestock are raised on commercially oriented ranches; ranches appear to account for 
less than 10 percent of the beef and milk reaching the commercial market.  Urban and 
periurban households are increasingly engaging in livestock keeping (Guendel 2002; 
Ishagi et al. 2002).  It is estimated that urban and periurban livestock keepers provide 
as much as 70 percent of Kampala’s eggs and poultry (Maxwell and Zziwa 1997, cited 
in Ishagi et al. 2002).  This paper focuses on rural livestock producers as these 
continue to constitute the majority; 96 percent of poor Ugandans live in rural areas 
(Okidi et al. 2004). 
                                                 
2 The data on livestock production in Uganda is limited, and a livestock census has not been conducted in the last five years.  
The estimates in this section are based on available data but should be treated with caution. 
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Livestock Marketing and Processing 
Rural livestock producers face substantial marketing constraints.  Sector participants 
identified infrastructure as a crucial constraint.  Much of Uganda’s infrastructure, 
including roads, market weighing stations, and cattle dips, was destroyed in the 
period between 1971 and 1985.  Although the state is rebuilding this infrastructure, 
transaction costs remain high.  It is expensive to move livestock from the rural areas 
where they are raised to the towns and urban centers where demand is highest, and 
the quality of livestock products often deteriorates during the transit process.  Most 
producers rely upon informal traders to market their goods.3  Milk traders purchase 
milk from farmers or collection centers and then market the milk or sell it to vendors 
for transport to urban areas (Kasirye 2003).  Livestock traders purchase animals at 
farms or local livestock markets and then transport them to abattoirs in urban 
centers.  One trader described the marketing process as follows: 
The cost of the car is an important factor in how profitable the sales are.  The 
distance to each market varies.  Some places are closer, but they are less likely to 
have a good supply of cows [for example, Jinga].  A trader might go to Jinga, Mbarara, 
or Nakasongolo.  They do not know in advance which markets will have good cows, but 
usually in the districts where they are good at pastoralism [which are farther away] 
they have cows.  The traders do not have agents, but go to each market and advance 
to the next one if there are not enough animals. 
                                                 
3 There are some milk collection centers and cooperatives through which dairy farmers collectively market milk.  See 
Kasirye’s (2003) report on the dairy sector and Muhereza’s (2003) discussion of livestock for more extensive analysis of 
marketing processes.  
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Livestock traders provide an important service.  However, the absence of market 
infrastructure creates an information asymmetry that disadvantages producers.  
Without weighing stations, grading systems, or instruments to test milk quality, 
traders and producers rely on their knowledge in reaching a sale price, and traders are 
likely to have better information.   
The absence of weighing stations makes it easier to cheat the farmers.  The traders 
have been in this for a long time, and they can look at the animals and know what 
they weigh.  The farmers don't have the same expertise (Interview). 
In October 2001, dry hides weighing between 10-11 kg were bought from small holder 
farmers for about Uganda Shillings 10,000 per hide or 1,000 per kg for Grade I and 
5,000 per hide or 500 per kg for Grade III (UIA 2003).  Exporters were realizing over 
shs 6,000 per kg when they sold the hides to export markets, with the average price 
per kg being shs 7,320 (Uganda Revenue Authority – Customs – Unpublished data Feb 
2001).  (From Muhereza and Ossiya 2003: 41)   
Pastoralists are particularly vulnerable during drought periods in which they must sell 
animals to purchase grain.  Pastoralists must move their animals long distances (often 
up to 100 kilometers) to market, and the condition of the animals deteriorates during 
the journey.  Because it is unlikely that the animals would survive a return journey, 
pastoralists become “price takers,” they must accept the prices offered even when 
they know they are unfair.  Systematic communication of agricultural price 
information could address this information asymmetry, but at present the system does 
not include livestock products. 
Facilities for processing livestock products are also limited.  Because there are few 
facilities for processing hides or canning meats, meats, hides and skins, horns and 
other parts are sold by the abattoirs in relatively raw form (King;, 2002c).  Although 
there are a dozen milk processing companies, their milk purchases are largely 
restricted to the southwest and central region (Kasirye 2003).  Lack of processing 
facilities increases the seasonal price fluctuations inherent in livestock markets 
because it diminishes marketers’ control over when goods enter the market.  
Processed products can garner higher prices, and livestock processors, traders and 
government officials stated that value addition has economic potential.  However, 
potential investors indicated that the inconsistency of power provision is a major 
disincentive because it increases operating costs and spoilage losses.  Although this 
problem is not unique to the livestock sector, it has particularly negative effects on 
products that require refrigeration.4  
Animal Disease and Health Service Provision 
Many livestock sector participants indicated that there is a need to improve the 
quality of Ugandan livestock.  However, widespread animal disease and inadequate 
animal health service provision are serious constraints to improving quality.  Endemic 
and epidemic diseases impose serious costs on livestock producers and reduce the 
                                                 
4 Because there is insufficient power to meet the demand, power companies have been scheduling periodic outages, a 
practice locally referred to as “load shedding”.  In some areas, load shedding occurs as frequently as every other evening. 
Companies experience substantial costs in paying for alternate sources of power or losses due to spoilage. 
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incentive to invest in “improved” animals that are more vulnerable to disease.5  An 
animal health service official (and trained veterinarian) commented: 
The most productive animals cannot survive here because of our endemic diseases.  
Yet our indigenous animals are low productivity; their best trait is disease resistance.  
For example the pig industry can't develop because of African swine fever.  Farmers 
can't keep many pigs because of the risk of catastrophic loss.  In the poultry industry 
we have Newcastle disease.  
As with the physical infrastructure, the government network for controlling disease 
and providing health services deteriorated substantially during the civil conflicts.  At 
independence, the government took responsibility for provision of all animal health 
services.  After the Museveni-led National Resistance Movement took power in 1986, 
the government withdrew from provision of clinical health services, which it regarded 
as a private good, and devolved other animal health services to local governments 
(See Silkin and Kasirye 2002:16-18).  The central government has retained 
responsibility for policy, regulation and disease control and surveillance.  Central 
government disease control has focused on epidemic diseases including rinderpest, 
contagious bovine pleuro-pneumonia, foot and mouth disease and rabies.  The system 
has encountered a number of challenges.  Local governments have not prioritized 
animal health services and disease surveillance, and central government has found it 
difficult to garner the necessary funds to respond to epidemics.  At present, it seems 
that the majority of veterinarians are employed by local governments to do regulatory 
work.  These veterinarians also unofficially provide veterinary services on a fee-for-
service basis.  Animal health service providers have also begun to operate as stockists, 
opening small shops that sell drugs and other livestock-related supplies.  A small 
number of veterinarians, perhaps 80, are fully engaged in private practice.6  Both the 
cost of treatment and the location of providers limit disease prevention, treatment 
and control.  Most formally trained animal health personnel are based in towns, and 
road conditions can make it difficult to reach remote producers.7  Despite its 
importance, most of the individuals interviewed for this report focused on other 
challenges facing the sector such as marketing, processing, and policy reforms.  One 
respondent commented: 
Five years ago if you visited you would have heard lots about disease.  It is a shift in 
thinking; if you look at the market all else will follow.  Can I afford the control regime 
for disease?  If you pay for the service, the treatment is there.  We used to focus on 
that - treatment.  Now we focus on markets and profitability so that farmers are in a 
position to control disease.  You figure out where the market is and then think about 
prevention and vaccine accessibility.  The market would trigger those things. 
Marketing challenges are discussed in the following section.  
                                                 
5 “Improved” animals are crossbred or exotic animals with the genetic potential to produce higher volumes of milk or meat 
than indigenous “unimproved” animals.  The actual performance of improved animals is highly dependent on the inputs 
(feed, fodder, water, health services) they receive. 
Most publications estimate that 95 percent of the Ugandan livestock population is indigenous, but Staal and Kaguongo 
(2003:14-15, Appendix) argue that the proportion of improved cattle is roughly 26 percent. It is likely that a much higher 
percentage of zero-grazed dairy animals are improved because the major charitable organizations that donate livestock, 
Heifer Project International and Send a Cow, provide improved animals and advocate zero grazing.   
6 The European Union funded a Veterinary Privatization Project, which was implemented by the Uganda Veterinary 
Association and the Pan African Programme for the Control of Epizootics.  About 40 veterinarians have participated in the 
program, out of approximately 600 registered veterinarians in Uganda (European Commission 2004). 
7 One respondent suggested that a community animal health worker initiative in Karamoja is meeting with some success. 
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Domestic and International Markets for Ugandan Livestock Products 
When I'm thinking about how and whether to invest, the foreign market is uncertain 
and the domestic market is limited.  Creating a proper dairy plant is expensive and 
you need consistent water, utilities, etc.  Right now, we are in a consolidation phase. 
A further constraint facing the livestock sector is the small size of the domestic 
market.  Uganda is a poor country and the purchasing power of most Ugandans is very 
limited.  Ugandan GDP per capita was US$1,390 (in purchasing power parity) in 2002, 
compared to an average of US $1,790 in sub-Saharan African countries (UNDP 2004).  
Although food accounts for roughly 60 percent of expenditure in rural households  
(UBOS 2001),8 meat and milk consumption is quite low.  Low milk consumption may 
also be attributed to consumer preferences; Ugandans consume less milk relative to 
income than people in neighboring countries (Staal and Kaguongo 2003).  Most of the 
milk processing facilities operate well below capacity (Kasirye 2003).  Additionally, 
market purchases of livestock products are limited by widespread household 
engagement in small-scale or subsistence agriculture.  Ugandans rely heavily upon the 
milk and the meat that they produce; a national household survey found that home 
produce accounted for about half of rural food consumption (UBOS 2001).9  Given the 
many barriers to optimal market functioning – especially high transaction costs and 
poor rural financial services—rural producers may be reluctant to take the risk of 
shifting towards commercial production.10  Until a greater proportion of rural 
Ugandans become integrated into the cash economy, the domestic market will rely 
heavily on urban and peri-urban consumers.  Ugandans residing in urban areas 
purchase about 90 percent of their food (UBOS 2001). 
In this context, many Ugandan livestock sector participants are looking to 
international markets, primarily in East Africa and the Middle East.  These areas are 
perceived to have fewer standards constraints than the European Union and the 
United States, and thus to be more realistic targets.  However, to sell products to 
these markets, Ugandan producers would need the capacity to ensure consistent 
quality and supply; sector participants indicated this would be a challenge.   
In the Middle East [there] are not so many barriers, but the quantity issue is a 
problem.  The contracts require consistent supply, such as 350 live white goats per 
week.  To meet that demand we would need trucks, transport, stocking materials. 
For export crops, Uganda cannot even meet its quotas for most of its trade 
agreements, so there is a problem internally in the agriculture structure and the 
quality of what we produce… 
The reality is that the number of constraints mean that the potential might remain 
rhetoric.  For example, supply-side constraints such as load shedding (see footnote 
number 4), and infrastructure.  The way it is now, there's no deliberate effort to 
address the supply issues.  We wouldn't have the capacity to supply those markets.   
Additionally, the government would need to address trade and regulatory issues.  
Research indicates that there is potential for export of livestock products to these 
                                                 
8 This figure reflects consumption of goods produced within the household as well as cash expenditures.  UBOS valued home 
produce at farm gate prices. 
9 While the majority of food crops are consumed within the household, about two th The domestic market is constrainedrds 
of livestock and livestock products are marketed (MAAIF 2004). 
10  Reluctance to shift towards commercial production may also reflect fears about political instability. Small-scale 
agricultural production allowed many people to survive during the Amin regime and the instability that followed. 
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markets if constraints are addressed (King 2002a, b, c).11  In 2001, the government 
announced a strategic exports promotion initiative which would include beef, hides 
and skins (King 2002a; Spilsbury, Naggaga, and Oyat 2003:20-21). 
Regulation and Enforcement 
Many livestock sector participants argued that regulation and enforcement are also 
major challenges.  Without good information regarding quality and enforcement of 
standards, there is little incentive for producers, traders and processors to invest in 
improving quality; poor quality milk will sell for the same price as high-grade milk.  
However, the capacity of government to enforce regulations, and of producers to 
meet high standards, is limited.  Several interviewees suggested that the Dairy 
Development Authority’s (DDA) approach has potential.  The DDA, a parastatal 
organization established to support the dairy sector, has used a mix of encouragement 
and enforcement to pressure traders to invest in hygienic storage facilities for milk.  
In introducing reforms, the DDA has consulted with dairy sector associations, 
developed timetables in partnership with these associations, and worked with private 
companies to ensure that appropriate equipment would be available for purchase.  
The DDA also has emphasized the benefits of new practices to traders and processors—
for example, reduced spoilage could increase the volume of saleable milk.  After 
regulations come into force, enforcement efforts—such as arrests of traders using 
plastic Jerry cans—are publicized widely.  The DDA has used this approach to shift 
milk traders from plastic Jerry cans to more hygienic metal cans and to encourage 
traders to set up coolers at collection points and to invest in refrigerated tankers.  
This strategy allows the DDA to make effective use of its limited resources; there are 
only seven  regulatory enforcement staff, including four inspectors.  (The DDA also 
works with The National Bureau of Standards and the police force to enforce dairy 
regulations).  In a context in which enforcement resources are limited, it makes sense 
to encourage good practice as well as punishing transgression.   
This overview has focused on the structure of the Ugandan livestock sector, and the 
challenges faced in raising and marketing livestock.  Although these constraints are 
serious, most are amenable to intervention.  The remainder of this paper focuses on 
the political and economic context in which livestock producers, processors, traders 
and policymakers operate.  This context facilitates some sector interventions while 
making others much more difficult.  Discussion of recent interventions that affect 
poor livestock producers, such as the Plan for the Modernization of Agriculture, the 
privatization of the Dairy Corporation and the African Development Bank-funded 
Livestock Development Program is integrated into the paper. 
 
                                                 
11 Although sector participants suggested that export markets would benefit all producers, it seems likely that large, 
commercially oriented farmers would be best positioned to benefit. 
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SECTION II: NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT GOVERNANCE: 
POLITICS IN SEMI-AUTHORITARIAN UGANDA 
Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Movement took power in January 1986 
after winning a five year guerrilla war.12  Since that time, the government has rebuilt 
many of the state institutions and much of the infrastructure destroyed between 1971 
and 1985.  The discussion that follows begins by describing the conflicts that continue 
to affect many parts of Uganda.  It then shifts to analysis of the semi-authoritarian 
regime Museveni has created.13  The Ugandan state devolves substantial power to 
elected local governments and provides opportunities for participation in policy 
processes.  However, security remains an overriding priority, civil liberties are not 
consistently respected, and the government relies upon clientelism to secure support.  
In this context, citizens are unlikely to take full advantage of opportunities to 
participate.  The discussion in this section focuses on electoral politics and other 
formal political structures.  Policy reforms and the consultative and participatory 
processes established by government are discussed in the next section.  
Enduring Conflict in Northern and Eastern Uganda 
The nineteen years of government under Museveni’s National Resistance Movement 
(NRM) represent the longest period of stability many Ugandans have experienced since 
independence in 1962.  In stable areas, the governance and economic reforms 
discussed in subsequent sections of this paper have had a major impact.  But many 
areas of Uganda do not enjoy stability.  Of the 56 districts, fourteen have experienced 
sustained conflict since 1986 (Tripp 2004).  In these areas, government interventions 
have focused on ending the conflicts.  Districts in the north and east of Uganda have 
been most deeply affected.  In the north, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has led an 
armed struggle against the government, often with support from the Sudanese 
government (Prunier 2004).14  The Uganda People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) is the 
primary organization fighting the insurgents, but the government has encouraged 
citizens to form militias and vigilante groups to defend themselves.  Occasional 
periods of stability have been followed by renewed violence, and more than one 
million Ugandans reside in Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps or engage in 
“night commuting” in which rural people flee their homes for the relative safety of 
the town each night (CSOPNU 2004; Van Acker 2004).  Museveni originally emphasized 
military defeat of insurgents over political negotiation (Oloka-Onyango 2004; Van 
Acker 2004), but the government has recently renewed efforts to reach a peaceful 
settlement with the LRA.  Civil society organizations also have sought an end to the 
conflict.  Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda, a coalition of 
about 40 international and domestic NGOs, has advocated a rights based approach to 
address the root causes of the conflict (CSOPNU  2004). 
In the Karamoja region of north-eastern Uganda, cattle rustling has devastated many 
communities.15  Victims and government officials have frequently blamed Karamajong 
                                                 
12 The name of the organization that holds power has changed several times. The National Resistance Army became the 
National Resistance Movement and it is now the National Resistance Movement Organization.  This paper uses the name 
National Resistance Movement throughout to refer to the Movement after the end of the guerrilla war. 
13 This paper follows Tripp (2004) in describing Uganda’s current political regime as semi-authoritarian.  
14  The Lords Resistance Army was preceded by the Holy Spirit Movement, which began in approximately 1987. The districts 
of Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader (Acholiland) have been the center of conflict for several years, but the conflict has spread south 
and eastward to Lira, Katakwi, Soroti and Kaberamaido.  
15 Karamoja includes Moroto, Kotido, and Nakapiririt districts.  Cattle raiding often affects communities in neighboring 
districts as well. 
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pastoralists for rustling; cattle raiding is a traditional practice.  However, many 
researchers contend that rustling dynamics are much more complex.  The following 
examples suggest some of the complexities.  Firstly, while external portrayals of 
rustling have tended to treat it as a single phenomenon, the Karamajong distinguish 
between cattle raiding, which enjoys legitimacy, and small-scale cattle theft and 
roadside banditry, which are less acceptable (Management Systems International et al. 
2002).  Secondly, small arms have become widespread in the region since the 1970s 
(Mirzeler and Young 2000).  These arms are less subject to cultural sanction than 
traditional weapons, they facilitate predation, and they can make it more difficult to 
resolve conflicts.  Government strategy towards armed individuals has fluctuated from 
attempts to use them as government auxiliaries to attempts to disarm them.  
Increasing pressure on land may also have increased reliance on raiding as other 
response to drought and famine have become less viable (Walker 2002).  Finally, it is 
not clear that the Karamajong are the only or principal cattle rustling perpetrators; 
some contend that members of the military are rustling cattle (Dolan 2000; Van Acker 
2004).  In conflict-ridden parts of Uganda, ending violence would be a significant 
move towards improving the livelihoods of livestock producers and other residents. 
These conflicts have political implications in addition to their devastating 
humanitarian costs.  First, the conflict reduces the funds available for social and 
economic investment in areas such as livestock.  The government allocates substantial 
funds to security.  Defense expenditures officially comprised 12.87 percent of the 
2002/2003 budget, amounting to more than 2.5 percent of GDP (World Bank 2003).16  
That year, the government increased defense spending by 20 percent, shifting funds 
away from other areas despite donor sanctions.17  Defense spending increased again in 
2003/2004  by close to  20  percent, and approximately US$200 million has been 
allocated for defense in 2005/2006 (Akwapt 2005).  Donors have continued to express 
concern about the disproportionate amounts devoted to security (Development 
Partners 2004).  Museveni’s views on this issue are reflected in the following 
statement, “We are therefore continuing to strengthen our defense forces: to neglect 
doing so would be like exposing meat when there are dangerous carnivores around” 
(Museveni 2000, quoted in Oloka-Onyango 2004).  International humanitarian agencies 
and foreign donors spend enormous sums on relief; the government spends a smaller 
amount on post-conflict recovery.   
Second, the ongoing conflict reinforces the influence of the security apparatus–
including the military, police and militias–relative to elected officials and civil 
servants.  It is extremely difficult to hold security organizations accountable when 
there is ongoing conflict.  However, if elected officials cannot make binding decisions 
without the consent of the military, then the regime is not democratic.18  There is 
evidence that the defense forces have engaged in humanitarian abuses and financial 
misdeeds within Uganda (CSOPNU 2004; HRW 2004; 2003; Omara-Otunnu 1992).  Illegal 
behaviour by members of the Ugandan security apparatus also has been well 
documented in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Jackson 2002; Reno 2002; UNSC 
2000; 2002).  The perpetrators include individuals close to the president, and for the 
most part, the individuals implicated in these scandals have not suffered severe 
                                                 
16 In 1999, the IMF set an upper limit on military spending of 1.9 percent of GDP; above that proportion, loans might be 
delayed or halted (Reno 2002).   
17 Defense expenditures comprised 14.08 percent of the total. In response, some donors (the United Kingdom and Ireland) 
withheld US$20 million in funds (DFID 2003). 
18 To have a democracy “the elected government must to a reasonable degree have effective power to rule” (Collier and 
Levitsky 1997). Much of the literature on the relationship between democracy and military power was developed in the 
context of debates about political regimes in Central and South America in which substantial powers were reserved for the 
military in ostensibly democratic regimes. 
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sanctions.19  Reno (2002) argues, “predation solves short-term problems of political 
control by keeping soldiers occupied” but undermines the ability of the state to 
control these “violence entrepreneurs” in the long run.  Oloka-Onyango (2004) argues 
that Museveni’s reliance on the military has undermined attempts to reduce 
corruption, reform the civil-service, and create democratic local government. 
Semi-authoritarian Politics: “No Party Democracy” and Local 
Governance 
In relatively stable regions of Uganda, the semi-authoritarian regime established by 
Museveni is the operative political context (Tripp 2004).  Semi-authoritarian regimes 
occupy a middle space between democracy and authoritarianism.  Concisely defined, 
democracies are political systems in which “elections are competitive, free, 
egalitarian, decisive and inclusive, and those who vote in principle also have the right 
to be elected—they are political citizens” (O'Donnell 2001).  Authoritarian regimes, on 
the other hand, are organized political systems in which citizens have few political 
rights, but the government does not engage in extensive mobilization, unlike 
totalitarian regimes in which citizens are expected to participate in organized 
political activities.20 Tripp (2004) argues that semi-authoritarian regimes are 
distinguished by “their lack of consistency in guaranteeing civil and political 
liberties.” Uganda’s political system combines substantial restrictions on political 
participation with regular elections and other opportunities for citizens to influence 
political decisions.  While Ugandan citizens ostensibly enjoy freedom of expression 
and association, human rights organizations have documented torture and abuse of 
individuals expressing unpopular viewpoints (FHRI 2003; HRW 2004; 2003).  At the 
same time, the media is relatively free and statements critical of the government are 
regularly published. 
After taking power, Museveni’s NRM government established a “no-party” or 
“Movement” democracy. Museveni saw political parties as a source of divisiveness and 
instability.  Although the NRM did not formally disband existing political parties, they 
were prohibited from nominating candidates for office.  All Ugandans were deemed to 
belong to the “Movement system” which would provide a broad tent for political 
debate and decision-making.   
“Movement” democracy means that individuals have the right to join the national 
political movements and participate in elected government councils in their places of 
residence.  Their elected representatives form additional councils in each larger 
administrative unit.  Since the Movement embraces all citizens who wish to join, its 
operation is considered incompatible with activity by political parties (Kasfir 2000). 
The system was initially described as transitional; Ugandan’s political liberties would 
increase over time as the state was rebuilt and citizens and organizations began to 
approach politics from a broader, less parochial perspective.   
                                                 
19  The government has established several anticorruption institutions and now conducts surveys to investigate corruption, 
but these institutions appear to be ineffective in punishing abuse of office by high-level officials  (Flanary and Watt 1999; 
Tangri and Mwenda 2001; Uganda. Inspectorate of Government 2003). The president’s brother Salim Saleh, who is a major 
general, was implicated in these scandals.  
20 This definition draws from Linz (2000) who described authoritarian regimes as “political systems with limited, not 
responsible political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology but with distinctive mentalities; without extensive or 
intensive political mobilization except at some points in their development; and in which a leader or occasionally a small 
group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones.”  
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Many citizens and some observers were initially sympathetic to the “no party 
democracy.”21  Ugandans’ experience with party-based competition has been largely 
negative.  Colonial practices exacerbated religious and ethnic divisions, and most 
political parties in independent Uganda have had a narrow religious or ethnic base.22 
Early Museveni Cabinets incorporated individuals from the major political parties, and 
the government established new local government structures that provided 
opportunities for popular participation.  These practices suggested that there was 
space for a diversity of views and for participation without parties.  Building on the 
local “Resistance Council” model developed during the war, the Museveni government 
created a multi-tier system of local councils throughout the country (Kasfir 2004; 
Mamdani 1996: Chapter 6).  Local governments enjoy substantial power, and 
councillors are selected by Ugandans.  Citizens directly elect members of the village 
council (LC1), sub-county council (LC3) and district council (LC5).  The parish councils 
(LC2) and county councils (LC4) are indirectly elected.23  Local governments are 
responsible for education, road services, agricultural extension, land administration, 
trade licensing and community development.  District Public Service Commissions have 
authority to hire and fire civil servants in these areas. 
Ugandans had no direct involvement in national affairs until 1994, when elections 
were held to select delegates to the Constitutional Assembly.24  The first presidential 
elections were held in 1996 by which time, Museveni had been head of state for 10 
years.  These elections violated the “free” and “egalitarian” requirements for 
democratic elections.  The Movement “system” was exempt from the restrictions 
imposed on political parties.25  In the 1996 and 2001 presidential elections, opposition 
candidates and their supporters were subject to intimidation and harassment (FHRI 
2003; Sabiti-Makara, Tukahebwa, and Byarugaba 2003).  In 2001, the losing candidate, 
Col. Besigye Kizza, challenged the election results in court.  The court ruling upheld 
the results but acknowledged irregularities (Judgment on Election Petition No. 1 of 
2001: Col. (RTD) Dr. Besigye Kizza, Petitioner v. 1. Museveni Yoweri Kaguta - 
Respondent, 2. Electoral Commission. 2001).26  In 2000, Uganda held a national 
referendum on the Movement system in which voters were asked to choose between 
the Movement system and multiparty democracy.  The movement system won 
overwhelmingly (See Bratton and Lambright 2001; Therkildsen 2002), but the 
referendum was nullified by the Constitutional Court in late 2004 because Parliament 
had not followed the proper procedures in passing the act enabling the referendum. 
In 2002, Parliament passed the Political Parties and Organizations Act after several 
years of debate.  The Act restricted party activities severely, prohibiting members of 
the security forces, public officers and traditional and cultural leaders from belonging 
to political parties, expressing views on party controversies, or engaging in activities 
on the behalf of the party  (Section 16).  It also prohibited parties from offering 
political platforms (Section 18(1(a))), opening branch offices (Section 18(1(c))), 
                                                 
21 See the range of views expressed in No Party Democracy in Uganda: Myths and Realities (Mugaju and Oloka-Onyango 2000; 
also see Ottemoeller 1998). 
22 See the following for discussion of social divisions and politics in Uganda (Apter 1961; Carbone 2003; Karugire 1980; 
Mamdani 1976; Okuku 2002). Apter, Mamdani, and Karugire discuss the colonial and early independence periods, while Okuku 
and Carbone focus on contemporary politics. 
23 One third of the seats on each council are reserved for women, and there are special councillors to represent youth, the 
disabled, and the elderly (village-level only).   
24 Before these elections, an indirectly elected National Resistance Council served as the national parliament. 
25 These elections were governed by transitional provisions of the 1995 Constitution, which allowed political parties to exist 
but banned most organized political activities. “… Political activities may continue except— (a) opening and  operating 
branch offices; (b) holding delegates conferences; (c) holding public rallies; (d) sponsoring or offering a platform to or in any 
way campaigning for or against a candidate for any public elections; (e) carrying on any activities that may interfere with the 
movement's political system for the time being in force” (Section 269).  
26 Besigye was detained on two occasions and subsequently left the country. 
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holding more than one national meeting per year (Section 18(2)) and interfering with 
the Movement system (which was explicitly not a party27) (Section 19).  All of these 
provisions, except Section 16, have been declared unconstitutional by the 
Constitutional Court, and political parties have started to open branch offices, 
prepare platforms and hold meetings. 
Over time, criticism of the no-party Movement system has increased.28  Critiques have 
come from former NRM stalwarts and high-level Museveni supporters, including Col. 
Besigye Kizza and former Cabinet ministers Kategaya and Matembe, as well as 
opposition parties, human rights activists, scholars and foreign organizations.29  
Critiques have highlighted the narrowing ethnic base of the cabinet (Kjaer 2004), 
favouritism displayed towards Museveni’s co-ethnies in military promotions (Okuku 
2002),30 corruption (Tangri and Mwenda 2001) and the party-like character of the NRM 
(Tripp 2004).  Surveys provide evidence that the President’s popularity has declined 
slightly and support for the Movement system has declined (Logan et al. 2003). 
Ugandan citizens and scholars have also begun to look critically at local governance 
structures (Francis and James 2003).  While decentralization ostensibly was intended 
to bring government closer to the people, much of the decision-making power is 
concentrated at the district level.  People have much less contact with district 
officials than with their village councillors, and it is difficult for citizens to hold these 
officials accountable.  The concentration of power in districts is evident in planning 
processes and revenue collection and allocation.  Although the village councils 
coordinate the development of Community Action Plans, these plans are then passed 
upwards to each level until they reach the district, which adopts an integrated plan 
based on the input of civil servants and NGOs as well as elected officials (Francis and 
James 2003).  Districts also collect the graduated tax, the primary local revenue 
source, and District Tender Boards control tender allocation—many districts have 
privatized the collection of local taxes and fees.31 The district governments receive 35 
percent of locally generated revenue while Village Councils receive only 16.25 
percent.  Francis and James argue that the Council system operates in “patronage 
mode.” District control over civil service positions and tendering allows for politicized 
distribution of these divisible goods; the more accessible village councillors have little 
power.  Although there have been notable successes, some frustration with the system 
is evident (MFPED 2002; also see MOLG 2004).  One interviewee commented, “The 
poor people have spoken but nobody cares.  Look at the local councillors.  A person is 
a councillor for two years and they have a huge compound and there is no delivery.”   
                                                 
27 Section 2 (1) defines a “political organisation” as “any free association or organisation of persons the objects of which 
include the influencing of the political process or sponsoring a political agenda whether or not it also seeks to sponsor or 
offer a platform to a candidate for election to a political office or to participate in the governance of Uganda at any level”; a 
political party is a political organization with a platform or candidates. Section 2 (2) states “The definition of ‘political 
organisation in subsection (1) shall not include the following— (a) the movement political system referred to in article 70 of 
the Constitution and the organs under the movement political system.” 
28 Tripp (2004) argues that 1995 was a turning point in the Museveni regime in which the government moved away from 
inclusionary governance towards a ruling strategy that favors loyalists and seeks to repress dissent; Okuku (2002; 2005) 
argues that Museveni’s ruling strategy has been narrowly ethnic and authoritarian from the start. 
29 Uganda is extremely dependent upon foreign aid, as is discussed in Section III.  To date, multilateral lending agencies and 
bilateral donors have refrained from imposing political conditionality on Uganda as was done in Kenya and Malawi. Donors 
have advocated, often behind the scenes, for greater democratization, (Hauser 1999).   
30 At independence, the Ugandan military was largely comprised of Northerners, including ethnic Acholi and Lango.  Okuku 
claims that military recruitment and promotions now favor Museveni’s ethnic group, the Bahiima, and other people from 
southwestern Uganda. He estimates that 10 percent of the military now come from Museveni’s home county. 
31 In his 2005 State of the Union address, President Museveni announced that the graduated tax would be eliminated, and 
central government would begin paying the salaries of district chairpersons, district executive members, sub-county and 
town council chairpersons. 
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Uganda’s political environment sends mixed signals to its citizens.  On the one hand, 
Ugandans are provided with real opportunities for participation and accountability.  
Local governments have considerable powers, and research indicates that Ugandans 
respect their village councillors, for the most part, and see the Village Council as an 
important and useful institution (MPFED 2002; Therkildsen 2002).  In theory, citizens 
could use their votes to remove unpopular officials, and some voters are trying to use 
elections to hold officials accountable: “We have got our pangas and sharpened them.  
Those snakes shall be wiped out using the votes” (MPFED 2002).  Although turnover in 
councillors is low (Francis and James 2003), Okuku (2005) states that there is a 70 
percent turnover rate in MPs in each election.  Elected officials exert some decision-
making power, and there are some cases in which capable officials have managed to 
improve outcomes.  In Ntungamo District, for example, residents reported better 
service delivery and more willingness to pay taxes than people from other districts 
included in the second  Ugandan Participatory Poverty Assessment.32  They also linked 
improved services to capable governance by local officials (MPFED 2002).  In addition, 
official policies state that local programs are to be developed through participatory 
processes.   
On the other hand, Ugandans are implicitly told that their participation is neither 
consequential nor desirable.  As the local government system is structured, the most 
accessible village councillors have very limited authority; district officials have much 
greater authority.  The influence of local voters is also diminished by the technocratic 
processes through which the national government uses its financial influence over 
local governments to make local governments upwardly accountable to national 
bureaucrats (Craig and Porter 2003; Francis and James 2003).  Central government 
transfers account for about 90 percent of local government incomes, and much of the 
revenue transferred its conditional.  Efforts to hold local officials accountable have 
been constrained by widespread clientelism and corruption.  In each of the 
participatory poverty assessments, rural Ugandans and civil servants described and 
condemned corruption among local politicians; district officials were regarded as most 
corrupt (MPFED 2000; 2002).  Corrupt activities included undermining service delivery 
and manipulation of the tendering process; there were very few instances in which 
corrupt individuals were sanctioned.  The second national participatory poverty 
assessment report describes one case as follows: 
… in 2001 in Madudu Sub-county, that covers Kitemba village in Mubende, the District 
Chief Internal Auditor audited the Sub-county’s finances after a complaint by the LC3 
Chairman about misappropriation of funds.  The audit discovered anomalies in the 
management of LGDP [Local Government Development Programme] funds and 
embezzlement of other funds.  The Sub-county Chief and Sub-Treasurer were 
arrested.  However, the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), much to the concern of 
community members and LC3 councillors, later released them (MPFED 2002:173). 
The 2002 report also described the recent emergence of mass vote buying; Muhumuza 
(2003) contends that vote buying and intimidation were widespread in the first local 
government elections.  Local government elections are particularly vulnerable to 
corruption and intimidation because voting is not by secret ballot, as in presidential 
and parliamentary elections (Mutumba et al. 2005) 
                                                 
32 The Ugandan Participatory Poverty Assessment Project is a Ugandan government initiative to incorporate the perspectives 
of poor Ugandans into the poverty reduction policy process.  Research teams conducted participatory rural appraisals in 
several sites across the country.  These appraisals were developed into district reports and national reports, and results were 
disseminated at the community, district, and national level.  The published reports provide more detail on the research 
methodology (See, for example, MFPED 2000; 2002). 
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Museveni’s harsh criticism of dissenters and the prolonged detention and torture of 
some individuals who have contested elections without NRM support sends a clear 
message that participation is only welcome within limits (See HRW 2004).  The 2002 
Suppression of Terrorism Act gives the government broad powers to act against 
perceived opponents of the state.  Ugandans may fear that criticism of councillors or 
the councils will be interpreted as criticism of the NRM.  
Given these mixed signals, most citizens are unlikely to take full advantage of the 
opportunities that may exist.  Recent agricultural initiatives emphasize a demand-led 
approach.  The National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS), for example, provides 
extension services in response to farmer group requests.  If farmers are uncomfortable 
making demands, the program cannot succeed.  However, the political context in 
Uganda is continuing to evolve, and some civil society organizations (CSOs) are 
encouraging citizens to engage with local government.33 
Some grassroots communities tend to associate policy work with going against 
government.  It is the process of building awareness around participation in the need 
for everyone to engage.... We can use service provision as a way to build awareness 
about processes and rights. 
Several CSOs have altered their structure to facilitate interaction with local 
governments.  The Uganda NGO forum, for example, has established district forums in 
several areas, and the Uganda National Farmers Federation includes 45 district 
associations.  These CSOs may provide an organized means for livestock producers to 
influence district policies and to take advantage of demand driven programs.  
At present, the overriding political question is that of presidential succession, or 
continuity.  The 1995 Constitution limits individuals to two terms as President, and 
Museveni’s second term will end in 2006.  Museveni has sought to retain his hold on 
power by eliminating the constitutional limit on presidential terms in office.  Museveni 
and his advisers floated this issue in public settings on several occasions.  For 
example, President Museveni was quoted as saying, “I have been hearing people 
talking of a ‘third term’ for the incumbent president” (Oloka-Onyango 2003).  Then 
government established a Constitutional Review Commission.  After failing to obtain a 
recommendation to eliminate term limits from the commission, the government 
drafted a white paper recommending that Parliament decide this issue (Republic of 
Uganda 2004).34  Parliament overwhelmingly comprises NRM adherents.  Despite this, 
the “Third Term” or “kisanja” debate inside Parliament and among the populace has 
been lively and a range of views has been expressed.  Two steps have been taken to 
facilitate the elimination of term limits.  First, the term limit provision has been 
incorporated into a compendium bill including several other measures, some of which 
also require constitutional amendments.35  Parliament must accept or reject the bill as 
a whole.  After the bill receives parliamentary approval, the government plans to hold 
a referendum on the measures requiring constitutional amendments.  Secondly, 
Members of Parliament have been bribed to support the third term with payments of 5 
million Ugandan shillings (about US$3,000).36  It is estimated that 223 Members of 
                                                 
33 Throughout this paper, civil society organization is used to refer to member based-associations, community-based 
organizations, and domestic or international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).  This reflects the Ugandan usage of the 
term. 
34 The government established a Constitutional Review Commission in 2001 to consider term limits and other issues.  In its 
2003 Final Report, the Commission recommended that the people decide this issue in a referendum. 
35 The bill would also reduce restrictions on political parties, recognize Swahili as a second national language, and allow the 
creation of multidistrict regional governance structures. 
36 These payments were widely reported in the media, and several articles were published in the daily newspapers the 
Monitor and the New Vision. Some individuals received a larger sum of up to 10 million shillings (US$ 6,000). 
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Parliament, including 213 voting members, accepted the “kisanja cash” (Gyezaho 
2004); constitutional amendments require the support of two thirds of Parliament, or 
204 members.  Parliament passed a resolution authorizing a referendum in early May 
2005; shortly thereafter the major opposition parties announced that they would 
boycott the referendum.  The referendum is scheduled for late July 2005.  The next 
elections for the President, Members of Parliament and District Council chairmen are 
scheduled for February and March 2006.  
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SECTION III: REFORMING UGANDA: NEO-LIBERALISM & PARTICIPATION 
This section discusses Uganda’s economic reforms, participatory processes, and their 
influence on policymaking.  Since 1986, the NRM government has implemented major 
economic reforms that seek to alter the state’s basic approach to the market and 
service provision.  This section begins by discussing the alliance that has successfully 
advocated reform.  It then turns to bureaucratic politics and the strategies adopted by 
civil servants skeptical of neo-liberal reform.  The reformist alliance also has focused 
attention on poverty, and national government has created participatory processes 
such as the Participatory Poverty Eradication Process through which farmers’ 
associations and other members of civil society can shape policy.  These processes 
provide opportunities for pro-poor interventions.  However, major policy decisions 
continue to occur largely outside the public domain.  The final part of this section 
discusses the privatization of the Dairy Corporation.  This case illustrates the limited 
influence of sector participants and highlights the potential of the Ugandan media to 
raise the visibility of less than transparent processes.   
Liberal Reform Alliance 
The alliance between key actors in the Ugandan government and major multilateral 
and bilateral donors has assisted the government to implement major reforms, 
including economic liberalization and decentralization.  The relationship between the 
Ugandan government and foreign donors and lenders has evolved over time as Uganda 
moved from reluctant adherence, through structural adjustment conditionalities, to a 
working relationship based on ongoing consultation with its “development partners.”  
Well reasoned proposals that fit within the framework on which government and 
donors agree find a receptive hearing.  Reducing poverty is an explicit objective of 
government policy and foreign aid; there are substantial opportunities to implement 
pro-poor interventions that fit within the framework. 
Museveni’s National Resistance Movement initially attempted to follow a divergent 
path, but price and foreign exchange controls failed to end the economic crisis.  It 
was in this context that the government accepted conditional aid from multilateral 
lenders in 1987.  The economic reform package advocated by donors was a fairly 
standard mix of economic stabilization and structural adjustment measures.37  Reforms 
sought to create macroeconomic stability, to increase Uganda’s openness to the 
international economy, and to reduce the state's role in the economy.  The 
government’s commitment to structural adjustment policies was initially weak and 
implementation halting.  In the early nineties, however, President Museveni became a 
vocal advocate of reform and implementation improved (Dijkstra and Van Donge 
2001).38  
Uganda is extremely dependent upon foreign donors and lenders—official development 
assistance accounted for more than 12 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2002/2003 (World 
Bank 2003).39 Since 1987, foreign aid has almost always exceeded exports and tax 
                                                 
37 John Williamson identifies 10 principles of the Washington Consensus: fiscal discipline, public expenditure (investment is 
greater than consumption), tax reform, financial liberalization, competitive exchange rates, trade liberalization, friendliness 
to foreign direct investment, privatization, market deregulation, and secure property rights (1993, discussed in Van De Walle 
2001: 138-139).   
38 Scholars’ views on Uganda's implementation of economic reforms vary.  While some argue that implementation of 
economic reforms has been incomplete and plagued with corruption (Tangri and Mwenda 2001; van de Walle 2001), others 
believe the government is committed to strict budgetary control and dismantling of parastatals and marketing structures 
(Dijkstra and Van Donge 2001). 
39 The World Bank is the largest multilateral lender to Uganda, and the United Kingdom is the largest bilateral donor. 
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revenues (Dijkstra and Van Donge 2001).  Donors fund about half of the government’s 
budget (DFID 2003), and in fiscal year 2002/2003, official development assistance 
accounted for more than 12 percent of GDP (World Bank 2003).  Although the 
relationship between donors and the Ugandan government was initially based on 
conditionality, donors gradually became convinced of the government’s sincere 
commitment to reform (Adam and Gunning 2002).40  One outcome has been a new way 
of working based on ongoing consultation and reduced policy conditionality.  The 
“development partners” participate in the development of the overall framework and 
sector programs through consultative group meetings and a wide array of working 
groups, which include civil servants, donors and, sometimes, civil society.  The 
development partners also have created donor groups for specific areas of interest.  In 
line with this way of working, several agencies, including the World Bank, the 
European Union, and the development agencies of the United Kingdom, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Ireland, Norway and Sweden have moved away from project funding 
towards general budget support, poverty action fund support and sectoral basket 
funding (World Bank).41 This new way of working has received substantial praise from 
outside observers and many participants (Adam and Gunning 2002), but some members 
of civil society believe that it gives foreign donors disproportionate influence as they 
have greater access to the government than civil society organizations and ordinary 
citizens. 
Over time, Uganda became a “show case” for neo-liberal economic reform (Dijkstra 
and Van Donge 2001).  Uganda’s economy grew an average of  6.3 percent a year 
during the 15 years following 1987, and inflation diminished substantially (Okidi et al. 
2004).  Additionally, the national poverty headcount fell from 55.7 percent in 
1992/1993 to 33.8 percent in 1999/2000, and the rural poverty headcount fell from 
59.7 percent to 37.4 percent over the same period (Okidi et al. 2004).  Uganda’s 
impressive economic growth was seen to demonstrate the benefits of reform policies, 
and it became a favored recipient of foreign aid.  By the end of the 1990s, however, 
the growth rate had diminished and the poverty headcount increased to 37.7 percent 
(national) and 41.7 percent (rural) in 2002/2003 (Okidi et al. 2004).  Some but not all 
of the reduced growth rate and rising poverty can be attributed to changing 
commodity prices and unfavorable agricultural terms of trade (Okidi et al. 2004).  
Many of the domestic contributors to the reduced growth rate may be difficult to 
address.  These include the small size of the domestic market, limited and 
inconsistent access to electricity, low agricultural productivity and high interest rates.  
Although agriculture comprises a substantial proportion of GDP, and is the primary 
source of most people’s livelihoods, agricultural productivity growth has been very 
low.  
There are some signs of tension in the government-donor partnership.  International 
donors were extremely displeased at the transfer of funds away from development 
expenditures and toward security in 2002-3, and have expressed concern about human 
rights, corruption and democratization (DANIDA 2003; Sweden 2004; DFID 2003).  
Museveni has repeatedly lashed out at foreign donors, particularly after criticism of 
his actions.  To date, however, there are few signs that donors and lenders plan to 
reduce their financial commitment to Uganda.  Instead, the government of Uganda 
and its development partners established a set of partnership principles in 2003 
(MFPED 2004a).  Since then, major bilateral and multilateral donors have raised 
concerns about democratization, corruption, and human rights with Ugandan 
government officials (Mugisa 2005; Mulumba 2005; Musoke 2005).  However, only 
Britain and Ireland had withheld funds based on these concerns as of June 2005.  
                                                 
40 Uganda was the first country to qualify for debt relief under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC II) 
initiative.  Proceeds from debt relief are allocated to poverty alleviation through the Poverty Action Fund.  
41 Basket funding is budget support earmarked for a particular area or initiative.  
Section III: Reforming Uganda: Neo-Liberalism & Participation 
18 
Changing Governance and Bureaucratic Politics 
The Ugandan government-donor partnership is based on shared commitment to a neo-
liberal framework.  Central tenets of this framework are that the role of government 
is to provide an enabling environment for the market, that service provision should be 
demand driven, and that a transformation in the population from a subsistence 
orientation to a market orientation is necessary.  Government provision of 
macroeconomic stability is a core part of this enabling environment.  This partnership 
has positioned the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) 
as first among equals (Brock, McGee, and Ssewakiranga 2002).  Because this ministry 
develops overall spending targets and assigns a budget ceiling for each sector, it can 
and does enforce fiscal discipline.42  The  medium-term expenditure framework 
estimates government revenue over the near term (three years) and establishes 
spending targets which are linked to macroeconomic policy goals.  Budget ceilings (or 
spending caps) are established for each sector based on government priorities.  The 
sectoral working groups and the relevant ministries then decide how to allocate funds 
within the ceiling.  This process focuses on spending rather than revenue; the budget 
ceiling may be smaller than the funds available. 
Donors tend to see MPFED as a bulwark of support for the reform agenda in the face of 
uncertain commitment to reform by bureaucrats more comfortable with old ways of 
working in which the government provided services directly, and with limited 
consultation.43  Although reform rhetoric pervades policy discourse—it is taken for 
granted that government must justify public involvement in service provision and 
‘interference’ in the economy—program proposals and comments in private settings 
indicate that many civil servants are highly sceptical that government withdrawal is 
appropriate given the weakness of the private sector.  The following comment is 
representative: 
I am a believer in promoting private industry, but government cannot get out of 
everything.  That is why we have become stagnant.  Strategic interventions, market 
failures, we did it [privatization] and we have not done well.  There are market 
failures.  Politicians and the private sector believe the government sector divested 
itself too early.  We must redefine the government role.  
As with other government ministries, the role of the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal 
Industries and Fisheries (MAAIF) has changed substantially.  As Animal Production and 
Marketing Commissioner Saamanya summarized: 
 The Ministry is no longer directly responsible for service delivery.  Instead, it seeks to 
play a facilitatory role and to create an enabling environment.  Functions: one, policy 
formulation and review; two, national planning of programs and projects; three, 
standard-setting, laws and regulations; four, technical support to local governments so 
that quality services are provided –this includes training and capacity building; five, 
control of epidemic diseases; six, monitoring and evaluation (interview). 
MAAIF’s new role requires substantial institutional transformation.  Previously, MAAIF 
had a large staff of agricultural extension and animal health officers who were 
directly responsible for service provision.  Many of these officials have been 
transferred to the districts and no longer report to MAAIF, but observers suggest that 
MAAIF has been slow to embrace its new role.  Reformers have often chosen to work 
                                                 
42 The primary area in which the spending limits are disregarded is security. Some executive offices, including the Office of 
the Prime Minister, have also consistently overspent (World Bank 2003). 
43 DFID targeted individuals in this ministry for support of the reform agenda (Brock, McGee, and Ssewakiranga 2002). 
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around existing government institutions given their uncertain commitment to reform.  
While MAAIF seeks to reform itself, the government has created, and donors have 
funded, new organizations to implement the new policy approach.  In the agriculture 
sector, new organizations include the Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA) 
Secretariat, the Dairy Development Authority (DDA) and the National Animal Genetic 
Resources Centre and Databank (NAGRC&DC).44  
The PMA is a multisectoral and multi-ministerial initiative that seeks to reduce 
poverty by improving agricultural productivity.  In general, the PMA seeks to shift 
farmers from a subsistence orientation to a commercial orientation, to increase the 
proportion of goods that are marketed and to address barriers to increased 
productivity.  The PMA Secretariat has been the focus of substantial contention.  
Formally, the Secretariat is simply a coordinating body.  It reports to a steering 
committee comprising all of the participating ministries and has little formal 
authority.  However, there is tension between the PMA and MAAIF.  Observers suggest 
that MAAIF has been sidelined in the reform process:  “[MAAIF is] not the policy 
engine, it doesn't set the direction of agriculture in Uganda.  And the people you look 
at are the PMA and the Ministry of Finance [MPFED] and donors” (Also see Spilsbury, 
Naggaga, and Oyat 2003).  Tension is exacerbated by a perception that donors have 
favored new organizations at the expense of MAAIF.  In one donor’s view this 
perception is both inaccurate, as agricultural expenditures have increased, and due to 
the Ministry’s failure to finalize its development strategy and investment plan.  
MAAIF’s perceived failure to adapt to the new policy environment may hinder its 
efforts to secure funds. 
While some observers have articulated substantive critiques of the PMA and its 
components (Ashley and Nanyeenya 2002; Bahiigwa, Rigby, and Woodhouse 2005; 
Manyire and Emmett 2004), its opponents within MAAIF have chosen not to challenge 
the PMA openly.  Instead, they have failed to prioritize PMA initiatives in budgetary 
allocations and have questioned its accomplishments.  The PMA identified seven 
priority areas for public investment: agricultural research and technology 
development, agricultural advisory services, rural financial services, agricultural 
education, agricultural marketing and agro-processing, natural resource use and 
management, and development of supportive physical infrastructure.  MAAIF is the 
lead ministry for the first two areas.  Progress has been extremely uneven, and it is 
generally agreed that reform of agricultural advisory services is most advanced.  A 
new organization, National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS), was created and 
has started to provide services on a demand driven, contract-based approach in 
several districts.  While critics assert that NAADS has received disproportionate 
funding, program implementation has been hindered by the allocation of substantially 
fewer funds than were anticipated.  Because NAADS received 13 billion Ugandan 
shillings rather than the budgeted Ush19 billion in 2003, it had to delay expansion of 
the program to six more districts (Bahiigwa, Rigby, and Woodhouse 2005).  In the 2004 
review, a NAADS official indicated that budget cuts in 2003/4 and spending 
projections for the two years to follow would require the program to reduce the 
number of sub counties involved from 153 to 137; NAADS was originally projected to 
be operational in 309 sub-counties by this point (NAADS 2004).  In this context, NAADS 
officials are understandably defensive.45  The National Agricultural Research 
Organization (NARO), which is leading agricultural research and technology 
development, also has failed to receive anticipated funding.  The priority areas of the 
PMA that are led by ministries other than MAAIF are much less advanced.  Although 
                                                 
44 The NAGRC&DC supports genetic improvement efforts and is seeking to commercialize provision of artificial insemination 
and breeding services. 
45 A donor advocated and financed external assessment should provide a more objective evaluation in the near future. The 
International Food Policy Research Institute is also developing a relationship with NAADS. 
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MAAIF officials are sometimes hostile to the PMA, they regard it as an important 
initiative and are engaged in ongoing interaction with the Secretariat.  It has been 
difficult for the PMA Secretariat to obtain high-level participation and funding priority 
from the non-agricultural ministries with primary responsibility for the other priority 
areas.  The Secretariat is attempting to address these problems.46  
The PMA and NAADS initiatives demonstrate the limitations of creating organizations 
as a response to resistance to reform.  While these organizations provide a means to 
work around recalcitrant bureaucrats, it is difficult for them to succeed without allies 
within existing organizations.  Donors have the ability to dedicate funds to favored 
initiatives—by allocating money to the NAADS’s basket, for example—but civil servants 
outside MFPED also have a number of strategies at their disposal.  The case of the 
African Development Bank (ADB) Livestock Development Program loan illustrates some 
of the strategies used by civil servants in the new environment.  
The ADB Livestock Development Program will provide the Ugandan government with 
approximately US$30 million in loan funds over five years (ADB 2002).  The program 
seeks to “reduce rural poverty by increasing the commercial orientation of subsistence 
agriculture through sustainable increases in livestock productivity and meat output.”  
The program has six components: livestock restocking and genetic improvement, 
improved livestock health status, improved livestock water supply and forest 
resources, improved livestock marketing systems, improved livestock information, and 
program coordination.  Several of the activities described and project documents are 
inconsistent with the new role of MAAIF described above.  For example, the program 
will give animals to households and construct cattle dips, valley dams and slaughter 
slabs.  These interventions may be well advised and pro-poor in their impact, but they 
are clearly inconsistent with the new approach. 
It seems clear that the civil servants pushing this project exploited procedural 
ambiguities in the project approval process.47  New agricultural projects are supposed 
to receive approval from MAAIF and MFPED, but at the time this program was 
approved, it was not clear which ministry had the final say, nor which subpart of 
MFPED should grant approval.  One sector participant stated: 
... it was quite interesting hearing them [MFPED]…discuss this issue and getting a 
viewpoint.  It is 180° of difference from what our perception is as people working in 
agriculture sector.  They were saying, ‘No, no, …the approval comes from 
agriculture,’ and we said ‘No, no, finance approves it,’ and they said ‘No, no, it's not 
us,... it's you guys!’ we said ‘Look, who approves these big loans?’ … of course, the 
point is that decision-making is very confused.  It is not clear who makes the 
decisions. 
Additionally, once a project has been entered into the budget, it is incorporated into 
the budget ceiling.  So MAAIF staff could indicate to MFPED that the project had been 
approved and put it into their budget. This task was made easier by the low level of 
activity in the agricultural sector working group.  As indicated earlier, sectoral 
working groups develop the sector budgets.  Some working groups meet regularly, thus 
providing an opportunity for regular oversight of policy implementation, but the 
agricultural working group does not.  
                                                 
46 A draft Agro processing and marketing strategy has been developed, and donors are grappling with approaches to rural 
financial services.  As discussed, problems with power provision affect all processors and marketers.  In 2003, only 1 percent 
of rural areas had access to electricity (Kiwawulo and Arinaitwe 2004). 
47 Discussion of this case is based on my interviews; it may not present a wholly accurate view of the process. 
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The adoption of the livestock development program has two consequences, which may 
be viewed favourably by critics of liberal governance and unfavourably by reformers.  
First, the program allows MAAIF to undertake activities that fit comfortably within its 
old style of working and addresses perceived gaps in the new approach.  In interviews, 
many actors within and outside MAAIF questioned whether conditions existed for 
market forces to produce desired outcomes without greater government intervention.  
In particular, people highlighted the weakness of the private sector and the lack of 
supportive infrastructure for livestock markets and disease control.  In the new 
system, producers are expected to pay for animal health services which are regarded 
as a private good.48  However, preventive animal health care often require 
infrastructure whose cost may be prohibitive for small producers.  Local governments 
could choose to create shared facilities, such as cattle dips and weighing stations, but 
few have done so.  
The role of the local authority is very unclear.  Although they are responsible for 
endemic diseases they are just displacing responsibility.  For example, tick and tsetse 
fly diseases are considered to be local [responsibilities], but the farmers are held 
responsible for the infrastructure for controlling these diseases.  You need dips, 
sprays, and pumps.  For tsetse, you could buy traps but you need chemicals.   
The traders told me that there are no weighing stations in the livestock markets... 
There was market infrastructure prior to the conflict.  We had the proper 
infrastructure -- weighing stations etc.  All of these were vandalized during the 
conflict.  I have asked government, “what are you doing?”  The local authorities are 
running away from responsibility.  They want to just privatize….The infrastructure 
should be provided and then the private sector can manage it.  
The livestock development program will enable MAAIF to put this infrastructure into 
place.  One program advocate stated, “We see this as a strategic intervention 
where assistance is needed.”  
The second consequence of the livestock development program is that it takes up a 
great deal of space in the budget, thereby limiting the funds available to other 
programs.  The MFPED has established an integrated budget ceiling and allocates a 
certain amount to each ministry.  With the exception of security, MFPED has been firm 
in enforcing the expenditure ceilings for each ministry.  If MAAIF has committed to 
spend Ush 10 million to implement the livestock development program, 10 million less 
is available for other programs, regardless of available funding.  These funds may well 
be taken away from programs with less ministerial support.  Because PMA initiatives 
are funded through the sectoral budgets, they are vulnerable in this process.  This 
issue was discussed during the 2004 NAADS review: 
Because of the restrictions of the MTEF [Medium-term Expenditure Framework] ceiling 
and the fact that donor contributions to the basket funding of NAADS are linked to 
GOU funding made available within MTEF, flow of funds to the programme had been 
below those expected.  This situation was becoming more serious… Donors emphasised 
that there was no shortage of money to fully meet the funding commitments they had 
made: however the principle of basket funding had to be preserved (Republic of 
Uganda. National Agricultural Advisory Services 2004:15). 
                                                 
48 Economic theory distinguishes between private goods and public goods.  A pure private goods exhibit excludability and 
rivalry, that is, the benefits accrue to the user and one person's use prevents another's.  Most goods fall somewhere along the 
spectrum between public and private goods.  For example, if a farmer builds a dip and vaccinates his cattle, he benefits 
directly from reduced losses due to disease.  However, neighboring farmers also are likely to benefit from reduced exposure 
to sick animals. The farmer who invests in preventative healthcare is  bearing the sole cost but does not monopolize the 
benefits. 
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While it is often the case that projects spend far less than is projected, these funds 
remain unavailable to other programs unless project leaders revise their commitments 
well before the end of the fiscal year.  
The discussions of PMA/MAAIF tensions and the ADB loan illustrate some of the 
dynamics of reform within the government.  These cases show that civil servants have 
the capacity to manipulate reform processes to support or undermine desired 
initiatives.  Livestock sector policy is unlikely to be wholly consistent as long as there 
is deep disagreement within the bureaucracy about the appropriate approach. 
Participatory Policy Processes: The Poverty Eradication Action Plan 
For the most part, livestock producers and civil society organizations do not directly 
participate in bureaucratic struggles.  Instead, citizens and CSOs participate in policy 
formulation through formal participatory processes and through direct contact with 
policymakers and donors.  The central government has created opportunities for 
associations, organizations and local governments to participate in policy formulation.  
These participatory processes have been pushed for and supported by major donors 
(Brock, McGee, and Ssewakiranga 2002).  As these processes have become 
institutionalized, many participants and observers have come to the conclusion that 
participatory processes offer some opportunity for influence, but the options 
considered are sharply constrained by the reform framework (Craig and Porter 2003).  
The discussion that follows focuses on policy formulation with regard to poverty 
reduction.49 
Poverty reduction is a shared objective of government and its development partners.  
The importance of poverty reduction is indicated by the decision to house the key 
poverty agencies within the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 
the most influential ministry. The Poverty Monitoring and Analysis Unit, the Uganda 
Participatory Poverty Assessment Process and the Planning and Poverty Eradication 
Section produce and publicize poverty data.  They also have coordinated the 
government’s poverty reduction policy process by jointly serving as the secretariat for 
the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP).  The PEAP has provided the overall 
framework for development since 1997.  The PEAP articulates the government’s policy 
priorities and approach to reducing poverty.50  Agriculture is identified as a priority 
sector for antipoverty intervention and strategies for the agricultural sector are 
provided in the Plan for Modernization of Agriculture (PMA).  
Although the initial PEAP was developed by a consultant to MFPED in consultation with 
the sector ministries and with little public participation, the process has become 
progressively more participatory in each subsequent round – the PEAP is revised about 
every two years.  The most recent PEAP revision began in July 2003 and involved 
systematic consultation with local government, the private sector and civil society.  
Civil society and private sector organizations were represented on the thematic 
diplomatic working groups, they submitted policy documents (Private Sector 
Foundation Uganda 2003; Uganda National NGO Forum and CSO PEAP Revision Steering 
Committee 2003), and they reviewed the draft PEAP.  
                                                 
49 Brock, McGee and Ssewakiranga  (2002) also discuss Ugandan poverty policy processes, their potential, and their 
limitations.  Although the views in this section overlap substantially with those in their paper, this discussion is based 
primarily on the author’s interviews.  
50 The Poverty Eradication Action Plan serves as Uganda’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for the World Bank. 
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The PEAP process provides substantial opportunities for public participation while 
ensuring the anti-poverty measures are consistent with the overall reform paradigm.  
The March 2004 draft stated:  
Government’s strategy for poverty eradication is based on transformation of the 
economy through private investment, industrialisation and export-led growth.  
Industrialisation in Uganda will be based on the country’s endowments of natural 
resources and labour.  Private investment will make these endowments more 
productive, driving up incomes and transforming the economy.  Over time, the 
demand for labour will increase, raising the share of wage employment and the level 
of wages. 
The role of agriculture is therefore complementary with the process of 
industrialisation.  For instance, industrial investment in processing will improve the 
market for farmers.  Similarly, increased agricultural incomes will increase the size of 
the domestic market for manufactured consumer goods and services.  For these 
processes to occur, there needs to be an enabling environment for private business.  
There is also a need for appropriate infrastructure and other public services. (MPFED 
2004b) 
Interviews indicate that public participation is taken seriously, but the basic 
framework is not open to question (c.f., Nyamugasira and Rowden 2002).  A lobbyist 
argued that the PEAP process, and policy processes more generally, whilst apparently 
open, are in fact quite restricted:  
Uganda, the government, that's the central government, is much more open, you can 
have an in, it's easy to walk in there.  It's very easy to do good research, to say ‘please 
include this’ or ‘this needs to be included otherwise poor people won't be 
represented.’  Policy formulation has been opened up a long way.  It's the policy 
implementation that is the problem and the failure to really be able to challenge the 
macroeconomic framework.  That the government will not listen to.  They'll shut 
down.  They will not respond….That is something they will not question; it is just not 
something you raise.  We are liberalizing and that is the way it is; we are privatizing 
and that's a good thing.  Poor people will need to pay for services in agriculture. 
Other participants indicated that the government seeks to ensure that the PEAP is 
consistent with other government policies and the agreed-upon division of labor 
between public sector and private sector activities.  
At the same time, the most recent PEAP revision process suggests participation is not 
meaningless; advocacy efforts can have an impact.  Several Ugandan civil society 
organizations engaged in an organized lobbying effort to alter the way in which the 
PEAP depicted pastoralists and addressed their issues.  Pastoralism is a contentious 
issue in Uganda, and “nomadism” has been condemned by influential politicians and 
senior civil servants.  The following statements by Minister of State for Animal 
Industry, Mary Mugyeni, are representative:  
In the livestock sector we continue to have nomads.  Running around this country … 
moving with their animals, spreading disease, living in very poor conditions…(Pro-poor 
Livestock Policy Initiative Workshop, November 8, 2004)  
So I know the problem with pastoralists…and we have to deal with them, very very 
seriously. …I want to comment, to request that wherever these pastoralists, these 
nomads, are, we give them a specific period of time and provide some funds,… give 
you [pastoralists] a particular period of time until … you are allowed to be here until, 
for not long maybe one year.  Within it you must find somewhere to go.  Buy your own 
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land because you have livestock.  We no longer have free land here.  Buy your own 
land, you have livestock…those who want the modern life can settle down.  Those who 
don’t want to be…, they will go and herd the animals of those who have modernized.  
But something must be done.  … People who don’t want change and modern life … 
they eventually have to settle, no doubt about it (Ugandan Veterinary Association 
Symposium, November 25, 2004). 
In the view of organizations that work with pastoralists, the previous PEAP reflected 
these perceptions by wrongly treating pastoralism as a source of insecurity and 
seeking to solve pastoralists’ insufficient access to land and water through 
sedentarization and provision of boreholes.  These organizations view pastoralism as a 
livelihood strategy that is often environmentally sustainable – and the best use of arid 
lands – and could be economically profitable.  Research indicates that, although the 
average number of cattle per household is high among pastoralists, pastoralists fare 
poorly by most measures of well-being (United Nations Development Program 2002).  
Pastoral communities tend to have inferior access to animal health services, human 
health services and education because services are oriented towards sedentary 
communities. 
 Pastoralism-supportive organizations adopted a multifaceted approach to the 
PEAP revision process.  PANOS and Oxfam, which are international NGOs, took the 
lead in this effort.  With the Ugandan NGO Forum and several other member 
organizations, they created a Civil Society Organizations Pastoral Task Force, 
commissioned research from local scholars (Muhereza and Ossiya 2003, 2004), 
cultivated relationships with staff in MFPED, and established a Pastoralism 
Parliamentary Group.  These efforts received support from friendly donor 
organizations, who funded educational efforts for policymakers.  Task force members 
participated in the PEAP revision process and submitted recommendations, backed by 
research findings.  Advocates made a strategic decision to engage with policymakers 
on their terms, and to argue that pastoralism makes economic sense: 
And so we started to think how can we make sure that pastoralists are included?  Now 
in the past people have made concerted efforts to [have] pastoralists included in the 
PEAP but they've always come from [a] human rights perspective and they've always 
been crushed.  Because you know around the world human rights is a very contentious 
issue to deal with and it's a very contentious issue because everybody asks you 
…‘Whose rights in Uganda are not being abused?  Why should pastoralists be 
different?’  And those questions are very tough and very sobering questions... but they 
brought us to ask more concrete questions ... and to look for a more suitable entry 
point until we realized that actually the PEAP is not just a development document but 
an economic document.  It's about money and you have to show that any intervention 
that you are taking or you are demanding for is going to make financial sense.  So 
you're correct to say political economy.  And so that was the challenge for us, to show 
that pastoralism makes economic sense.  So we used two entry points: economics and 
we used human rights… 
Although the final version of the PEAP had not been published by the time this report 
was written, the PEAP drafts in circulation describe pastoralism as a livelihood 
strategy and identify pastoralists as a vulnerable population.  As the PEAP provides the 
framework for development policy, the discussion of pastoralism in the new PEAP 
provides an entry point for civil society organizations to engage with the ministries 
directly involved in livestock policy, service provision and other issues.   
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Civil Society Views of Participatory Processes 
Representatives of civil society organizations express a wide range of views about the 
impact of their participation and its value relative to the time and staff energy it 
consumes.  Some argue that formal participatory processes are an improvement from 
past exclusionary practices: 
I think, we've moved a long way.  There's a lot of opportunity for NGO's…  But the 
framework can never be fundamentally changed.  But at the same time since the 
space is there, maybe you keep on engaging, you keep on challenging.  It's better than 
it [is] not being there.  If the alternative is that the government decides everything 
and we sit down and we go ‘Okay, what can we do’ So I think that's how it works. 
The idea of civil society engagement in policy is not very old.  I would not want to lose 
the opportunity to make comments.  I think that you can achieve more by working 
from the inside. 
Others have become sceptical about the impact of participation: 
This consultation process.  They are consulting with local government functionaries, 
not the grassroots.  They're going to the subcounty and the districts.  There is a 
culture of seminars.  These consultations are with administrative people not with the 
grassroots.  It is two thieves chasing one another.  They know that the representatives 
have not consulted the grassroots.  The donors see this but they stay quiet.  It is two 
thieves doing funny things together.  They don't want the voice of the real people but 
the appearance. 
In addition to the PEAP revision, CSOs participate in some sector working groups, the 
gender donor group and the PMA Steering Committee.  CSO participants have 
sometimes found group norms silencing.  Meetings often are dominated by donors and 
government officials, who have greater technical expertise and familiarity with the 
processes under review.  Because most Ugandan NGOs are financially dependent on 
foreign donors and government contracts, vocal disagreement in group meetings may 
be difficult.  Instead, organizations that are disappointed with consultative settings 
have sometimes expressed disagreement through statements to the press.  Other 
group members  then become upset that the organization has taken a disagreement 
outside the group rather than addressing it within the group.  
ActionAid, an international NGO active in Uganda, has published an analysis of 
participation in the poverty reduction strategy process (ActionAid International 
Uganda et al. 2004; also see Gariyo 2002). The authors argue that the processes are 
donor-driven and silence debate about important national policy issues like monetary 
policy, land reform and trade.  ActionAid suggests that civil society organizations 
consider creating other venues for broader policy discussion as a complement to, or 
replacement for the government poverty reduction policy processes.  The Ugandan 
NGO Forum is conducting an evaluation of the impact of CSO participation in the PEAP 
revision.   
For most Ugandan civil society organizations, involvement in policy consultation and 
advocacy is a new experience.  Civil society organizations are now asked to share their 
viewpoints and to serve as partners with government in research and service 
provision.  Organizations are often comfortable and experienced in service provision, 
but policy processes require a new set of skills.  In interviews, CSO staff and civil 
servants agreed that civil society organizations need to develop greater technical 
expertise to analyse, formulate and negotiate policies.  Several Ugandan CSO 
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associations, including the Uganda National NGO Forum and the Development Network 
of Indigenous Voluntary Associations, are leading advocacy efforts or assisting member 
organizations to build their capacity.  
The new openness to societal participation is a dramatic shift for cooperative 
associations and other farmers groups.  These organizations were subject to strict 
controls during the 1970s, and many ceased to function.  The government is now 
encouraging the revitalization of cooperatives.  Although agricultural associations are 
routinely invited to participate in government policy processes, there has been little 
organized advocacy outside the dairy sector to date.  However, the Agricultural 
Council of Uganda is seeking to promote policy analysis and advocacy among 
commodity associations.  The Uganda Beef Producers Association,  a fairly new 
organization comprised primarily of large producers, is engaging with the government 
on key issues. 
Dairy Sector Reforms: Participation and Exclusion and Privatization 
Processes 
The dairy industry is the most organized livestock subsector in Uganda.  There are 
several dozen local producers associations or cooperatives, four district unions, 
regional dairy associations and associations for traders, processors and breeders.51  
Many of the cooperative organizations predate the Museveni regime, whilst the others 
are relatively new.  The largest charitable organizations that donate livestock, Heifer 
Project International and Send A Cow, only work with groups.  Additionally, a recent 
USAID project has encouraged the formation of associations.52  Dairy organizations are 
particularly strong in the south west, where milk is relatively abundant but prices are 
low.  Many producers in this area are obligated to sell their milk to the Dairy 
Corporation because it owns local milk collection centers.   
It might be expected that dairy sector participants would be well-positioned to 
influence government decisions regarding the sector.  Local dairy cooperatives have a 
longer history than other livestock producers associations, some dairy cooperative 
leaders have held political office, and the President comes from the dairy-oriented 
south-west.  However, dairy associations and private sector dairy companies have had 
little influence on the privatization of the Dairy Corporation.  Established in 1967 to 
develop the dairy industry, the Dairy Corporation is the largest milk processor in 
Uganda.53  More than 13,000 farmers sold milk to the Corporation in 2002 (Mwenda 
2005).  The Corporation has suffered from severe financial difficulties and the 
government has often been called upon to subsidize its continued operation.  Dairy 
producers have also expressed dissatisfaction with the Corporation: 
The Dairy Corporation isn't giving us good prices.  If we had an alternative we wouldn't 
sell to them.  But the machines—the coolers and generators—that we are using belong 
to the Dairy Corporation.  We are using their equipment to put in our milk.  We will be 
coming to abandon these people.  We will get away from them. 
                                                 
51 Organizations include the Uganda National Dairy Farmers Association, Uganda National Dairy Traders Association, Ugandan 
Dairy Processors Association, Ugandan Veterinary Management Association, Eastern Uganda Dairy Farmers & Breeders 
Association,  Northern Uganda Dairy Farmers & Breeders Association, Central Uganda Dairy Farmers & Breeders Association, 
Western Uganda Dairy Farmers & Breeders Association, and the Ugandan National AI Technicians Association. 
52  The US Agency for International Development jointly funded the giant Land O’Lakes cooperative, Heifer Project 
International, and World-Wide Sires to promote the private dairy sector in Uganda, and a number of organizations were 
started under the aegis of this project, which is coming to a close. 
53 The functioning of the Corporation was severely impaired, and much of the infrastructure was destroyed during the Amin 
regime and the civil conflicts that followed. In the late 1980s, the Corporation was rehabilitated, and much of the 
infrastructure in south western Uganda was restored. 
Section III: Reforming Uganda: Neo-Liberalism & Participation 
27 
Although farmers have not yet been able to sever the relationship with the Dairy 
Corporation, they have withheld milk in response to unacceptable prices.  This tactic 
led to some improvements, demonstrating the potential power of collective action. 
In Uganda, privatization is influenced by conflicting economic and political 
imperatives.  From an economic perspective, the Dairy Corporation has been a drain 
on state resources and might well function better under private management.  
Privatization is consistent with a liberal reform strategy of state withdrawal from 
inappropriate attempt to take on private sector functions.  From a political 
perspective, privatization is an opportunity to allocate favors; one can use the 
divestment of state assets to reward allies or donors.54  It is clear that political 
considerations have often trumped economic factors in the privatization of state 
assets.  The government has established regulations to govern privatization; 
privatization processes have been governed by a Divestiture Statue since 1993.  The 
government also has established a Privatization Unit, housed in MFPED, to manage the 
divestment of parastatals.  This unit evaluates the organizations to be divested and 
issues requests for bids; it is supposed to divest each organization to a suitable bidder.  
Despite this, state assets have been undervalued and granted to political loyalists in 
several cases (Tangri and Mwenda 2001; Uganda Debt Network).55  In others, President 
Museveni has unilaterally intervened to determine which company will be awarded 
ownership, as is the case with the Dairy Corporation. 
After the government decided to privatize the Dairy Corporation, dairy producers in 
the Southwest, who sell much of their milk to the Corporation, sought to persuade the 
government to divest the Corporation to dairy farmers, and, with support from the 
Dairy Development Authority,56 the farmers formed a national association, the Uganda 
National Dairy Farmers Association.  However, it became clear that the government 
would not give farmers a majority share.  Instead, the privatization unit issued a call 
for the prequalification of companies and consortiums.  There were several responses 
to this call, and four consortiums were pre-qualified in December 2003.  At that point, 
communication with the consortiums, dairy associations, and Divestiture Reform and 
Implementation Committee stopped.  
The Dairy Corporation is a mystery.  Things have been going on for a long time and we 
don't know what's going on (November 12, 2004 Interview).   
In October 2004, a newspaper article revealed that the Cabinet had ordered the 
suspension of the Corporation’s privatization, and its lease to a Thai company 
(Nnanozi 2004).  The rationale for postponing privatization was a proposed school milk 
program.  The announcements led to immediate speculation because the Thai 
company, Malee Sampran Public Company Ltd., was experiencing serious financial 
difficulties.  Subsequent stories revealed that the president had ordered the lease for 
a nominal fee of one dollar,57 and that the Thai company willingness to lease the 
                                                 
54 Van de Walle (2001) argues that African political leaders have used privatization to reward and penalize key 
individuals and groups.  Lewis and Stein’s (1997) study of Nigerian financial sector privatization illustrates how political 
actors can manipulate the process. When privatization is dominated by political considerations, it rarely produces the 
desired economic benefits.   
55 Cases include the privatization of Uganda Airlines Corp., Apollo Hotel Corp., Uganda Commercial Bank, Uganda 
Consolidated Properties Ltd., and Uganda Grain Milling Corp. Ltd. 
56 The Dairy Corporation was responsible for developing the dairy sector and regulating it as well as marketing milk for 
several decades.  In 1998, the Dairy Development Authority was created and granted responsibility for regulation and sector 
development; the Dairy Corporation continued to collect, process, and market milk. 
57 The Privatization Unit proposed to charge the company US $1 million plus rental fees and a proportion of profits (Mwenda 
2005). Museveni argued that the low fee was necessary to persuade this “very serious and successful investor” to take on the 
out-of-date factory and to develop food-processing potential (Museveni Defends 1 Dollar Dairy Corporation Deal 2005).   
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Corporation was conditional on the grant of the school milk feeding program to itself 
as a guarantee of demand.  Additionally, the Thai company was considering 
subcontracting its lease obligations to one of the consortiums, and two Cabinet 
ministers had established a front company, Pan African Foods Limited, to take the 
lease on behalf of the Thai company.  In late February 2004, the Parliamentary 
Committee on Finance and Economic Development suspended the lease agreement 
pending further consideration.  Vice President Bukenya then issued a directive which 
“expressly forbids Malee Sampran from using a Ugandan firm as the contracting lessee 
and from sub-contracting its lease obligations to a third party” (Mukasa 2005).  In 
April, the Minister of State for Privatisation Peter Kasenene announced that the 
government had decided not to lease the Dairy Corporation to Malee Sampran Public 
Company Ltd but to hire managers from the company instead.  Later that month, it 
was announced that the corporation would be sold to Ugandan dairy farmers 
(Karugaba 2005a).  Since an executive at the Thai company accepted a management 
contract in May, it is not clear who will control the company (Karugaba 2005b, c; 
Nalugo 2005).   
The privatization of the Dairy Corporation directly affected thousands of dairy 
farmers, and granting the school milk program to Malee Sampran would have 
negatively affected other milk processing companies.58  In 2003, there were 12 private 
milk processing companies, most of which were operating at less than 30 percent of 
capacity (Kasirye 2003); the school milk program was an attractive contract to many 
domestic processors.  Despite this, sector participants were excluded from this 
process until the series of stories by the Monitor newspaper brought these processes 
into the open and stirred Parliamentary action.  In Uganda, presidential interventions 
are frequent and difficult to challenge: 
“Can't somebody else take care of this business, does it always have to be the 
President? That is why I always say it's a one-man state…couldn't the Prime Minister or 
Vice President do something or anybody else?”  
In President Museveni, all Uganda's problems seem to find their final arbitration 
(Gyezaho 2005). 
Uganda’s reforms have created space for consultation and participation.  
Parliamentary oversight of divestiture provides a venue in which affected parties can 
plead their case; the dairy divestiture committee included the president of the 
Bushenyi Dairy Industry Cooperative Union.  Like other new government agencies and 
parastatals, the Dairy Development Authority regards consultation as an integral part 
of its work.   However, the influence of these agencies, civil society organizations and 
affected parties is limited when formal procedures are not followed.  This case 
illustrates the limits of participatory reforms in a semi-authoritarian context.  Because 
Uganda’s media is relatively free, garnering press coverage of irregular activities may 
be one of the few tools available to those without high-level political contacts. 
 
                                                 
58 The United Nations World Food Program subsequently withdrew its tender for school milk provision because the 
government’s demand that one supplier receive the tender violates UN requirements for open and fair bidding (WFP Pulls Out 
of School Food Deal 2005). 
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CONCLUSION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR STRATEGIC INTERVENTION 
This section outlines several interventions that could improve the livelihoods of poor 
rural livestock producers.  The proposed interventions seek to reduce barriers to 
producer benefit, such as high transaction costs, widespread disease and insufficient 
information that reduce producers’ benefits and diminish their negotiating ability.  
The proposed interventions work within the dominant neo-liberal market approach.  
While this perspective seeks to constrain government intervention in markets, 
governments are supposed to provide an enabling environment for the market and 
ensure the provision of public goods.  These services are necessary for markets to 
fulfil their potential.  Markets do not exist in isolation, and they cannot perform well 
without support.  Crucial services provided by the state include the provision of order 
and a legal, administrative and regulatory infrastructure (Chaudhry 1993; Evans 1995).  
Scholarship also has highlighted the importance of information and transaction 
costs(Leonard 2000).59  The proposals suggest some ways in which intervention could 
improve market functioning and enhance producer benefit.  
Improving Livestock Sector Infrastructure 
Although the government has prioritized road construction and rural electrification, it 
has not devoted equal attention to sector-specific infrastructure.  Weighing stations, 
cattle dips and milk collection centers facilitate the operation of the livestock sector.  
Weighing stations provide buyers (traders) and sellers (livestock producers) with 
information that facilitate valuation of the products being sold.  Cattle dips facilitate 
disease prevention.  Collection centers enable dairy farmers that produce only a small 
amount of milk to sell their milk jointly.  Collection centers also can reduce losses 
from spilled milk. 
These semi-public goods are unlikely to be provided sufficiently without intervention.60  
Their cost is such that few small producers could afford individual purchase, and the 
Ugandan livestock sector overwhelmingly comprises small producers.  Most local 
governments have tendered out the management of livestock markets and privatized 
abattoirs and slaughter houses.  Market managers and local governments could afford 
to create a common infrastructure, but they do not benefit directly from their 
existence.  For them, sick animals or lower cattle prices are externalities; they do not 
bear these costs.  Other actors, such as livestock traders, may benefit from the 
absence of infrastructure.  Because livestock traders buy and sell animals on a regular 
basis, they have access to price information and develop skill at assessing livestock.  
Because small-scale producers sell their animals infrequently, they are less likely to 
be able to assess the market value of their livestock in the absence of weighing 
stations and standardized grading systems.  
Government intervention to facilitate provision and maintenance of this sectoral 
infrastructure would benefit poor producers, but direct government provision of this 
infrastructure, as envisioned in the ADB Livestock Development Project, is not the 
only possible approach.  The government could also require livestock market managers 
to provide weighing stations, or it could allocate space in which farmers groups could 
                                                 
59 The literature on new institutional economics has focused on these issues (See, for example, North 1990; Williamson 1975, 
1999) 
60 A pure public good exhibits nonexcludability and nonrivalry (one person’s use does not prevent another’s).  These traits 
create free rider problems; since those who bear the costs of provision cannot exclude others from benefit, there is little 
incentive to invest. For semi-public goods, exclusion is difficult and/or subtraction (crowding) effects occur.  Willingness to 
pay for these goods depends on how the exclusion and rivalry problems are addressed, as well as on the private benefits 
garnered by recipients of these goods. (Also see footnote 48.) 
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place weighing stations, cattle dips and other collective infrastructure.61  There are 
dairy cooperatives in Uganda and elsewhere that have established collection centers.62  
Alternatively, government or nongovernmental organizations could subsidize the 
purchase of infrastructure, facilitate negotiations with suppliers to provide 
appropriate products and encourage standardisation of products.  
Improving Incentives for Market Participation and Productivity 
The mission of the PMA is “eradicating poverty by transforming subsistence agriculture 
to commercial agriculture” (MAIIF and MPFED 2000). At present, however, poor 
producers, traders and processors face a number of disincentives to investment in 
commercial production.  Rural producers lack good information about the prices their 
goods may receive at markets, and they consequently make decisions about what to 
market and how much to invest in their animals based on sparse and possibly 
inacurate information.  Although producer ignorance may benefit other sector 
participants in some cases, in others it simply represents a loss to the sector as  
livestock products are unsuited to higher value uses.  While there have been 
initiatives to provide crop information through the radio, there has been no systematic 
dissemination of livestock price information for several years (ADF 2002).  
Interventions to disseminate livestock market information broadly are clearly 
warranted and could be undertaken by government, donors, or the private sector.  
Because substantial capital and technical expertise in communications would be 
required, this intervention is likely to be outside the capacity of producer groups. 
Producers that sell their livestock encounter a prohibitive array of taxes and fees.  
Selling a cow may require purchase of a movement permit and a movement letter, 
and payment of a market tax and a slaughter tax (Bahiigwa et al. 2004; Ellis and 
Bahiigwa 2003).  Bahiigwa and co-authors (2004) argue that these fees are regressive; 
“poor people with small quantities to sell pay relatively much higher dues than less 
poor people with larger quantities to sell.” These fees are a disincentive to 
participate in formal markets, and may undermine prospects for commercialization.  
Their research also indicates that the revenues generated by these fees are not 
sufficient to outweigh these costs (Bahiigwa et al. 2004; Bahiigwa, Rigby, and 
Woodhouse 2005).  Government intervention would be necessary to remove these 
disincentives. 
For processors and marketers, insufficient quality differentiation is a disincentive to 
investment.  It is more expensive to produce high-grade, hygienic products, and, at 
present, there are limited markers for high-quality goods at the lower end of the 
market.63  Without interventions to alter the incentive structure, the poor quality of 
livestock products is likely to inhibit exports to foreign markets.  Strategies to improve 
the incentives could include greater government enforcement of existing standards 
and private sector investment in branding to allow price differentiation.  A grading 
system for livestock products could assist producers, marketers and consumers to 
make informed decisions about price and quality. 
                                                 
61 The literature on common pool resources suggests that collective provision and maintenance of this infrastructure by its 
users may be superior to state or private management (See Ostrom 1990).  
62 For example, the Kirinnya Women’s Cooperative Society has a small center in which it collects milk, packages it for sale, 
and makes yogurt. While this infrastructure was largely built by the group, its members have benefited from livestock 
donations and organizational capacity building from Heifer Project International. 
63 UHT milk is sold in distinctive vacuum packs and commands a premium.  However, this milk is too expensive for most 
Ugandan consumers. 
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Linking Information to Reform Assessments 
The Uganda Government has implemented several initiatives to reduce poverty, 
including the PEAP and the PMA.  Agricultural and livestock interventions use a group 
and enterprise-based approach.  Given the scepticism about these interventions 
among civil servants and civil society organizations, these programs are under 
pressure to deliver results.  In this context, there is a tendency to focus on the 
outcomes that will be measured, for example, the number of farmer groups or sub-
counties served by NAADS (PMA 2004).  In the rush to demonstrate success, there is a 
risk that poor producers will lose out.64  Groups located in poor areas do not 
necessarily benefit poor people, and mixed groups that include women and poor 
people do not necessarily represent them (Isooba et al. 2003; Peterson 1982).  Thus, it 
is important to incorporate measurable indicators of the extent to which poor people, 
pastoralists, women and other marginalized groups participate in programs and 
benefit from them (Also see Bahiigwa, Rigby, and Woodhouse 2005:6, 11-12).  Doing so 
will encourage program implementers to focus on this area (c.f. Adam and Gunning 
2002).  This information also will assist poor people’s organizations and CSOs 
advocating on behalf of the poor to monitor success and advocate change.65  
Development partners that fund these initiatives could encourage the government to 
incorporate disaggregated participation and outcome data into these programs.  For 
example, the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics could include relevant indicators in 
household surveys or censuses. 
Supporting Citizen and Civil Society Participation 
For most of Uganda’s history, the government has sought to repress participation 
rather than to encourage it.  Most Ugandan civil society organizations have little 
experience participating in policy development or engaging with local governments.  
In this context, poor livestock producers are unlikely to take full advantage of existing 
opportunities to participate, or to create new opportunities to participate.  National 
and international organizations that have some experience and participatory processes 
or policy advocacy could contribute to poor people’s participation by building the 
capacity of membership associations to participate in public policy.  Support could 
include sharing information about participatory processes – for example, describing 
how the budget process or the non-sectoral conditional grants66 are supposed to work –
, supporting groups of poor producers, linking similar groups in different areas and 
facilitating participation (See Houtzager and Kurtz 2000).  For example, ActionAid 
Uganda is supporting several regional networks that work on agriculture and food 
security.  The networks identify their policy priorities and decide what approach to 
take.  Because participation in politics is sometimes met with repression, individuals 
and local group should retain control over their level of engagement and form of 
participation.  Local people are likely to have a better sense of implicit political 
boundaries, and they will live with the consequences of their choices. 
While none of these interventions would guarantee improved livelihoods, each of the 
proposed interventions would increase livestock producers’ capacity to engage with 
                                                 
64  As Bahiigwa and co-authors (2005) observe, there is disagreement on whether PMA should prioritize poverty reduction or 
“modernization.” There is sufficient ambiguity in the PMA to provide implementers with flexibility. Spilsbury, Naggaga, and 
Oyat (2003) argue that implementation to date has tended to favor the better off. 
65 This intervention would build upon existing attempts to assess the impact of NAADS on poor producers (See Manyire and 
Emmett 2004; MPFED 2002).  
66 The non-sectoral conditional grants are transfers to local governments that may be used on any poverty reducing activity 
that benefits the community as a whole and falls into a priority sector (separately funded sectors, including health and 
education), are excluded. These funds could be used to support livestock sector interventions.   
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the market and with the state.  Small changes, such as provision of weighing stations, 
could increase the extent to which poor producers benefit from their livestock and are 
motivated to invest in them.  The interventions discussed above would not alter the 
fundamental political context of semi-authoritarian governance and enduring violent 
conflict in much of the country.  There are no simple strategies for resolving these 
deeply rooted problems, and Ugandans will decide how to address them through their 
individual and collective actions over the long-term. 
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